Summary
- The
cbor2 library is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack caused by uncontrolled recursion when decoding deeply nested CBOR structures.
- This vulnerability affects both the pure Python implementation and the C extension (
_cbor2). The C extension correctly uses Python's C-API for recursion protection (Py_EnterRecursiveCall), but this mechanism is designed to prevent a stack overflow by raising a RecursionError. In some environments, this exception is not caught, thus causing the service process to terminate.
- While the library handles moderate nesting, it lacks a configurable, data-driven depth limit independent of Python's global recursion setting. An attacker can supply a crafted CBOR payload containing thousands of nested arrays (e.g.,
0x81). When cbor2.loads() attempts to parse this, it hits the interpreter's recursion limit, causing the call to raise a RecursionError.
- By sending a stream of small (<100KB) malicious packets, an attacker can repeatedly crash worker processes faster than they can be restarted, resulting in a complete and sustained Denial of Service.
Details
- The vulnerability stems from the recursive design of the
CBORDecoder class, specifically how it decodes nested container types like Arrays and Maps.
- Inside
decode_array (and similarly decode_map), the decoder iterates through the number of elements specified in the CBOR header. For each element, it calls self.decode() again to parse the nested item. This recursive call lacks a depth-tracking mechanism.
- Vulnerable Code Locations:
cbor2/decoder.py (Pure Python implementation)
source/decoder.c (C extension implementation)
- Execution Flow:
- The
cbor2.loads() function initializes a CBORDecoder and calls its decode() method.
- The
decode() method reads the initial byte and dispatches control to a specific handler based on the major type. For an Array (Major Type 4), it calls decode_array.
decode_array loops and calls self.decode() for each item, leading to deep recursion when parsing a payload like [...[...[1]...]...].
PoC
import cbor2
DEPTH = 1000
payload = b'\x81' * DEPTH + b'\x01'
print(f"[*] Payload size: {len(payload) / 1024:.2f} KB")
print("[*] Triggering decoder...")
try:
cbor2.loads(payload)
print("[+] Parsed successfully (Not Vulnerable)")
except RecursionError:
print("\n[!] VULNERABLE: RecursionError triggered!")
except Exception as e:
print(f"\n[-] Unexpected Error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
Impact
- Scope: This vulnerability affects any application using
cbor2 to parse untrusted data. Common use cases include IoT data processing, WebAuthn (FIDO2) authentication flows, and inter-service communication over COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption).
- Attack Vector: A remote, unauthenticated attacker can achieve a full Denial of Service with a highly efficient, low-bandwidth attack. A payload under 100KB is sufficient to reliably terminate a Python worker process.
Credit
This issue was discovered by Kevin Tu of TMIR at ByteDance. The patch was developed by @agronholm.
References
Summary
cbor2library is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack caused by uncontrolled recursion when decoding deeply nested CBOR structures._cbor2). The C extension correctly uses Python's C-API for recursion protection (Py_EnterRecursiveCall), but this mechanism is designed to prevent a stack overflow by raising aRecursionError. In some environments, this exception is not caught, thus causing the service process to terminate.0x81). Whencbor2.loads()attempts to parse this, it hits the interpreter's recursion limit, causing the call to raise aRecursionError.Details
CBORDecoderclass, specifically how it decodes nested container types like Arrays and Maps.decode_array(and similarlydecode_map), the decoder iterates through the number of elements specified in the CBOR header. For each element, it callsself.decode()again to parse the nested item. This recursive call lacks a depth-tracking mechanism.cbor2/decoder.py(Pure Python implementation)source/decoder.c(C extension implementation)cbor2.loads()function initializes aCBORDecoderand calls itsdecode()method.decode()method reads the initial byte and dispatches control to a specific handler based on the major type. For an Array (Major Type 4), it callsdecode_array.decode_arrayloops and callsself.decode()for each item, leading to deep recursion when parsing a payload like[...[...[1]...]...].PoC
Impact
cbor2to parse untrusted data. Common use cases include IoT data processing, WebAuthn (FIDO2) authentication flows, and inter-service communication over COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption).Credit
This issue was discovered by Kevin Tu of TMIR at ByteDance. The patch was developed by @agronholm.
References