fix: pin 17 unpinned action(s),extract 7 unsafe expression(s) to env vars#7719
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code-asher merged 2 commits intocoder:mainfrom Mar 26, 2026
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…vars Automated security fixes applied by Runner Guard (https://github.com/Vigilant-LLC/runner-guard). Changes: .github/workflows/build.yaml | 8 ++++---- .github/workflows/publish.yaml | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- .github/workflows/release.yaml | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Might as well.
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Security: Harden GitHub Actions workflows
Hey, we found some CI/CD security issues in this repo's workflows using Runner Guard, our open-source CI/CD security scanner at Vigilant. These are the same vulnerability classes being actively exploited right now in the tj-actions, Trivy, LiteLLM supply chain attack chain. We scanned the top 50K repos on GitHub and over 20,000 have this same problem. We're trying to get fixes out to as many maintainers as possible before more repos get hit.
This PR fixes what we could automatically, and flags anything else that needs a manual look. There's a real person behind this PR, we're actively checking back on comments so if you have any questions just drop them here and we'll respond.
Fixes applied (in this PR)
.github/workflows/build.yaml.github/workflows/publish.yaml.github/workflows/publish.yaml.github/workflows/release.yaml.github/workflows/release.yamlAdvisory: additional findings (manual review recommended)
No additional findings beyond the fixes applied above.
Why this matters
GitHub Actions workflows that use untrusted input in
run:blocks, exposesecrets inline, or use unpinned third-party actions are vulnerable to
code injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. These are the same
vulnerability classes exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files incident
and subsequent supply chain attacks, which compromised CI secrets across
thousands of repositories.
How to verify
Review the diff — each change is mechanical and preserves workflow behavior:
${{ }}expressions fromrun:blocks intoenv:mappings, preventing shell injection(original version tag preserved as comment)
Run
brew install Vigilant-LLC/tap/runner-guard && runner-guard scan .or install from therepo to verify.
Found by Runner Guard | Built by Vigilant Cyber Security | Learn more
If this PR is not welcome, just close it -- we won't send another.